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ABSTRACT
The　present　paper　discusses　both　psychological　and　institutional　factors
relevant　to　the　siting　of　power　plants　in　Japan．　　First，　a　preferability　of　co－
existence　of　hard－　and　soft－energy　paths　is　examined．　　Secondly，　usefulness　and
limi．tations　of　risk　communication　are　analyzed　in　relation　to　the　‘word　vs．
deed’　paradigm．　　Thirdly，　the　importance　of　various　institutiona互　arrangements
is　discussed　with　respect　to　developing　a　symbiotic　scheme　for　power　plants　and
people　living　in　neighboring　communities．
1．　THE　JAPANESE　AMB　I　VAしENCE
Strong　ambivalence　and　mixed　feelings　characterize　current　Japanese　attitudes
toward　nuclear　power　and　related　matters．　Mixed　feelings　involve　both　acceptance
o’?@nuclear　energy　as　a　necessary　a．nd　important　energy　sollrce，　and　fear　of　it　as
a　source　of　radioactive　contamination．　　Such　a皿bivalence　has　persisted　since
the　first　com【necial　reactor　was　put　into　operation　at　Tokai　Mura　in　1966；　and　it
was　further　magnified　by　both　the　Three　Mile　Island　and　the　Chernobyl　accidents．
1．1．　Futurism　and　determinism　as　the　Japanese　ph　i　l　osophy　of　energy
Recent　national　public　opinion　polls　regarding　energy（1）（2）　seem　to　indicate
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that　the　Japanese　are　not　only　ambivalent　to　nuclear　power，　but　also　to　future
energy　alternatives　at　large．　　Contrary　to　a　common－sense　sPeculation，　a　great
majority　of　the　Japanese　（nearly　80％）　are　found　to　accept　a　continued　use　of
nucIear　power　ln　1990．　　While　a　majority　of　the　Japanese　（33％）　hold　that　both
the　nuclear　and　the　oil　will　be　the　major　source　of　energy　in　2000，　0nly　a
minority　（20％）　think　that　the　solar　energy　wnl　be　the　major　source　of　energy
in　2000．　On　the　other　hand，　the　Japanese　are　sharply　split　in　their　opinion
regarding　nuclear　safety　（51％　　consider　it　safe，　and　49％，　dangerous）．　　It　is
also　noteworthy　that　only　a　minority　of　the　Japanese　（30％）　consider　that
nuclear　power　serves　for　the　purpose　of　environmental　protection．
Taken　altogether，　the　general　philosophy　of　energy　in　the　Japanese　may　be
summarized　as　follows：
‘‘ht　is　not　true　that　nuclear　power　does　not　disrupt　the　environment．　　It　is　true
that　nuclear　energy　emits　neither　NOx　nor　CO2　but　it　generates　harmful　radwaste．
　　　　　　　　　　　　，
DesPite　this，　the　preferred　soft－energies　are　still　beyond　reach　at　Present．
Hence，　at　leat　toward　2000，　we　cannot　but　continue　to　use　the　nuclear　power
along　with　the　oil　and　the　hydro．”
The　Japanese　philosophy　of　energy　is　thus　highly　‘futuristic’　because　the　future
is　imaged　as　safer　and　more　hopeful　than　the　present．　It　is　also
　‘deterministic’，　because　the　Japanese　are　3ware　that　the　actual　energy
alternatives　are　‘finite’　（nuclear，　oil，　and　solar）　and　little　wishful　thinking
．is　possible．　　It　seems　certain　that　the　post－Chernobyl　Japanese　are　swaying
between　futurism　and　determinism　and　increasingIy　tend　to　leah　to　soft－energies
toward　2000．
2．　WHO　OPPOSE　THE　HARD－ENERG　I　ES
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1t　is　commonly　beheved　that　women　generaliy　are　more　sensitive　to　rlskS　than
men．　　To　test　this　hypothesis，　a　study　was　carried　out　in　1990　by　the　present
investigator　with　500　Tokyo　housewives　serving　as　subjects。（3〕
2．1．　Perceived　r　isk　and　benefit
F亘rst，　perceived　risk　and　benefit　of　g　man－made　objects　are　measured　on　4－point
‘risky－not　risky’　and　‘beneficial－not’beneficial’　scales．　　Using　the　mean　scale
scores　computed　for　each　concept，　it　was　found　that　the　g　objects　can　be
classified　into　four　categories：　（1）　low　risk／high　benefit；　　（2）　medium
risk／high　benefit；（3）high－risk／low　benefit；　and　（4）high　risk／high　benefit．
Table　l　summarizes　the　rersult　of　this　comparison．
TABLE　1．　PERCEIVED　RISK　AND　BENEFIT　OF　9　0BJECTS．
（1）LOW　RlSK／HlGH　BENEFIT：
　　　herb　medicine
　　　Vltamins
（2）MEDIUM　RISK／HlGH　BENEFIT：
　　nuclear　power　plant
　　oil　power　plant
　　travel　by　air
（3）HlGH　RlSK／LOW　BENEFlT：
　　food　additives
　　spray　using　CFC　（chloro－fluoro－carbon）
　　smoking
（4）HlGH　RlSK／HIGH　BENEFIT：
　　automibile
Considering　a　psychoIogical　tradeoff　between　risk　and　benefit，　each　of　the　three
‘high　risk／low　benefit’　objects　may　be　regarded　as　【nost　socially　objectionable，
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whereras　each　of　the　two　‘low　risk／high　benefit’　objects　may　be　viewed　as
socially　most　preferred．　　It　may　be　a　logical　conclusion　that　people　are
inclined　to　reject　what　is　perceユved　as　the　most　socially　objectionable，　while
they　are　wi11ing　to　accept　what　is　regarded　as　the　most　socially　preferred．
Both　‘vitamins’　and　‘herb　medicine’　are　thus　classified　to　the　most　preferred
group．　That　‘herb　medicine’　is　classified　as　one　of　the　most　preferred　lnay
suggest　the　presence　of　a　llnique　traditional　value－attitude　characteristic　of
the　Japanese。　　‘Nuclear　power　plant’，　proves　to　be　as　acceptable馳as　are　‘oil
power　plant’　and　‘travel　by　air’，　even　if　it　is　not　classified　to　the　most
preferred．　　‘Automobile’　is　perceived　at　the　same　time　as　highly　risky　and　as
highly　beneficial．　On　the　other　hand，　‘food　additives’，　‘spray　using　CFC’　and
‘・m・ki・9’are　classifi・d　t・th・m・s・・bjecti・nabl・ゴ
as
2．2，　The　clustering　of　500　Japanese　housewives
Secondly，　a　statistical　analysis　called　‘cluster　analysis’　was　carried　out　in
・rder　t・examine　h・w　500　h・usewives　can　be‘segmented’i・t・sρveral　i・dependent
groups　on　the　basis　of　both　their　demographic　attributes　and　their　attitudinal
characteristics　regarding　‘social　participation’　and　‘perceived　risk　and
benefit’．　　Five　meaningful　clusters　were　obtained　as　the　result　of　this　analysis．
Each　cluster　was　then　named，　according　to　unique　demographic　attributes　and
attitudinal　characteristics　of　the　component　subjects．　　The　name　of　clusters
and　their　typical　characteristics　will　be　sumInarized　as　follows．
Cluster－1／The　conservative　activists　（N＝72；　14％）：
Mostly　in　the　30－40　age　group；　mostIy　highschool　graduates；　m母ny　are　working；
interested　in　participating　in　anti－nuclear－weapon，　anti－nucIear－power，　ant董一
pollution　protests；　interested　in　politica且　and　economic　affairs；　perceiving
nuclear　energy　as　being　dangerous　but　beneficial．
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Cluster－2／The　optimisticsilent　majority　（N＝121；24％）：
Some　are　in　the　20－30　and　many　are　in　the　30－40　age　group；　mostly　highschooI
graduates；　few　are　working；　not　interested　in　environ【nental　problems，　political
and　economic　affairs，　and　nuclear－energy　issues；　perceive　nuclear　energy　as
being　both　safe　and　beneficial．
Cluster－3／丁he　socially　indifferent　（N＝56：　11％）：
Mostly　in　the　40－50　age　group；　most且y　highschoGl　or　trade－school　graduates；　not
interested　in　environ皿ental　problems，　political　and　economic　affairs；　not
interested　in　participating　in　anti－nuclear－weapon，　anti－nuclear－Power，　or　anti－
pollution　protests；　perceive　nuclear　energy　as　not　being　beneficial．
Cluster－4／The　progressive　activists　　（N＝56；　11％）：
Mostly　in　the　30－40　age　group；　mostly　univeゴsity，　college，　and　junior－college
gradllates；　only　few　are　working；　interested　in　politica1，　economic，　and
international　affairs；　interested　in　participating　in　various　volunteer
activities，　anti－nuclear－weapon　and　anti－nuclear－power　protests　and　peace
demonstrations；　perceive　nuclear　energy　as　being　both　dangerous　and　not
beneficial　and　perceive　oil　energy　as　being　not　beneficial；　highly　critical　of
nuclear　power　piants　as　not　being　in　safe　operation；　believing　that　the　science
does　not　contribute　to　enrichment　of　life．
Cluster－5／The　representative　silent　majority　（N＝195；　39％）：
Mostly　in　the　30－40　age　group；　many　are　trade－school　graduates；　few　are　working；
interested　in　viewing　TV’s　sports　programs　and　reading　shopping　magazines：　not
interested　in　anti－nuclear－weapon　and　anti－nuclcear－power，　anti－pollution
Protests；　Perceive　nuclear　energy　as　being　beneficial．
3．　SEGMENTED　PUBL　l　CS　AND　R　l　SK　COMMUN　I　CAT　l　ON
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The　foregoing　clustering　of　500　Japanese　housewives　may　well　ilIustrate　the　ways
in　which　they　are　segmented　into　5　groups　and　how　these　5　groups　are　found　to
differ　in　their　average　demographic　attributes　and　attitudinal　outlook．
AIthough　the　result　may　be　highly　culture－bound，　it　can　still　be　seen　that　those
housew孟ves　in　Cluster－4　named　‘‘Progressive　activists”，　who　are　more　highly
educated，　politicaHy　and　sociaIly　more　aware　and　more　active，　and　non－working，
constitute　outright　opponents　to　the　hard－energy，　especially　the　nuclear　power．
Not　only　are　they　anti－hard－energy，　but　they　are　also　skeptical　of　the　role　of
science．　　ContrarY　to　the　common－sense，　higher　e〔1ucation　and　richer　knowledge
seem　to　convert　Japanese　housewives　to　being　more　anti－hard－energy，　more　anti－
nuclear　and　more　anti－science　．
The　foregoing　findings　empirically　demonstrated　that　“the　audience　of　risk
communication　are　almost　never　homogenous．”　　This　poses　an　interesting　but
serious　problem　for　the　pursult　of　effective　risk　communication，　whose　basic
purpose　is　defined　as　“encouraging　lay　publics　to　understand　the　nat1】re　of
risks　rationaIly　and　avoid　these　risks　wherever　it　is　possible．”　In　the　previous
case　of　500　Japanese　housewives，　there　are　at　least　five　different　segments　（or
clusters）　of　the　audience；　ranging　from　those　who　are　totally　indifferent　of
both　energy　issues　and　social　and　political　affairs；　through　those　who　are　aware
of　energy　issues　and　conditionally　accept　nuclear　power；　to　those　who　are　aware
of　energy　issues　but　totally　reject　the　hard－energy．　　Consequently，　it　is　false
to　assume　that　there　is　‘the　public’．　　There　is　no　single　‘public’．　　There　are
many　‘segmented’　pub豆ics，　who　differ　in　their　demographic　attributes　and
value／attitude　complex．
Ri・k・・mm・nicati・ns・theref・、re・・h・uld　be　addressed　t・each・f　these　segmented
publics，　by　using　apPropriate　‘strategies’，　by　selecting　apPropriate　‘methods’
and　‘media’，　and　by　encoding　appropriate　‘messages’．　　In　view　of　the
effectiveness　of　risk　communication，　it　should　also　be　remembered　that　the　best
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message　is　not　by　word，　but　by　deed．　　A　repeated　promise　by　word　of　nuclear
safety　and　usefulness　would　only　serve　for　reducing　credibility　and　the　public
trust，　until　or　unless　it　is　backed　up　by　actual　deed．　　In　our　post－Chernobyl
era，　therefore，　nuclear　safety　and　usefulness　would　never　be　perceived　as　bei．ng
real，　until　the　world　becomes　well　devoid　of　serious　nuclear　accidents．
4．　CO－EX　I　STENCE　OF　HARD－　AND　SOFT－ENER（iY　PATHS
The　reslllt　of　recent　opinion　polls　indicate　that　a　majority　of　Japanese　expect
the　mix　of　hard－　and　soft－energies　to　come　into　reality　in　2000．　　It　is
worthwhile　to　conjecture　whether　the　mix　of　hard－　and　soft－energies　or　thelr
co－existence　lnay　be’psychologica正ly　acceptable．　　Just　consider　the　PoPular
belief　among　lay　publics　in　Japan　that　the　nuclear　power　constitutes　a　major
cause。f　envi，。nment、l　disrupti。n　6y　p，。duci，g　radwast，一！一　、　seri。、s　threat　t。
several　generations　of　offsprings　to　come．　　If　this　is　what　a　greater　majority
of　people　tend　to　believe　today，　it　would　be　hardly　possible　to　neglect　this
popular　belief　in　our　democratic　society．
Such　co－existence　of　hard－　and　soft－energies　would　be　rewardlng　in　the　long　run，
despite　its　possible　setbacks．　　First，　in　theory，　the　new　steps　to　co－exisIence
would　offer　a　real　challenge，　not　a　retreat，　in　view　of　the　continuously
increasing　need　for　energy　whatever　means　may　be　required．　　Second，　in　practice，
the　new　steps　would　introduce　a　new　aggressive　stance　of　the　industry　in　such　a
direction　as　the　publics　have　long　wanted　and　patiently　awaited　in　search　of
“safer”@energy．　　They　would　thus　serve　to　restore　the　public　trust　which　has
severely　deteriorated　after　Chernobyl．　　Third，　in　economic　terms，　desPite　the
initial　costs，　the　new　steps　would　offer　to　the　industry　the　chance　to　take　an
important　initiative　to　create　a　new　generation　of　commerciaI　energy　in　a　post－
fossil－　and　post－nuclear－fuel　age．　　Fourth，　in　psychological　terms，　the　new
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steps　would　serve　to　reduce　the　tension　between　the　industry　and　the　pvblics　by
producing　tangible　evidence　on　the　long－term　as　well　as　the　short－term　cost－
benefit　tradeoffs。　It　may　become　clear　that　there　are　both　technological　and
economic　limitaLtions　of　soft－energy，　at　least　for　the　time　being．　　And　fifth，　in
a　perspective　toward　the　future，　the　pubhcs，　who　are　‘aImost　never　homogenous’，
would　have　a　single　unobjectionabIe　goal　that　is　common　to　an　segments：　the　new
soft－energy　path　whatever　limitations　and　problems　it　may　demonstrate．　　The
soft－energy　path，　in　this　sense，　would　be　a　socio－economic　experi皿entation　in
an　unprecedented　scale．
5．　INST　I　TUT　l　ONAL　ARRANGEMEN丁S　AS　ECONOM　I　C　AND　PSYCHOLOGICAL　INCENT　I　VES　TO
　　　PUBL　l　C　ACCEPTANCE
Economically，　nuclear　power　．is　a　paradox，　because　despite　its　dark　image
connoting　‘‘radiation　，　‘‘radioactive　waste”，　and　　Chernobyl”，　it，　brings　a
considerable　amount　of　economic　benefit　to　the　localities　where　nuclear　power
plants　and　other　nuclear　facilities　are　sited，　and　to　the　individuaIs　who　might
otherwise　suffer　great　loss．4　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　『　　　　　　　　　　　　　　・
In　Japan　at　present，　four　different　kinds　of　economic　compensation　are　given　to
the　fishermen　who　are　affected，　and　to　the　locality　where　a　nuclear　power　pIant，
or　a　nuclear－related　facility　such　as　an　enrichment　or　a　reprocessing　Plant，　is
to　be　constructed．
5．1．　　Fishing－right　compensation
First，　there　is　what　is　usuaIly　known　as　‘the　fishing－right　compensation’，　whose
purpose　is　to　purchase　the　right　of　fishing　from　fishermen　whose　catch　might　be
adversely　affected　by　hot　waste　water　from　the　nuclear　powe．r　plant．　This　is
paid　by　the　electric　company　to　fishermen’s　cooperative　associations，　which
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distribute　it　among　members．　　According　to　statistics，　this　compensation
averages　approximately　10　million　yen　（or　US＄80，000）　per　member　of　the
aSSOCiatiOn，　（5）
5．2．　Reg　iona　l　deve　loPment　cooPerat　ion　funds
Secondly，　there　is　what　is　called　a　‘regional　developInent　cooperation　fund’，
which　compensates　psychological　anxiety　which　might　be　caused　by　the　presence
of　a　nearby　nuclear　power　plant．　The　average　amount　of　this　fund　per　member　of
a　fishermen’s　association　is　said　to　be　equal　to　or　a　little　below　that　of　the
　‘fishing－right　compensation’，　　In　l984　the　national　average　of　these　two　f1】nds
combined　amounted　approximately　13　mill孟on　yen　（or　US＄104，000）　per　10，000　kW　of
generating　capacity，
5．3．　　つengen　Sanpoh’　subsidies
Thirdly，　there　is　a　special　grant　awarded　by　the　national　government　to　local
governments　in　localities　where　a　nuclear　power　plant　is　sited，　under
legislation　known　as　‘Dengen　Sanpoh’，　or　the　‘Three　Laws　Pertaining　to　Sources
of　Electricity’，　enacted　in　1974．　　A　fuH　grant　is　awarded　to　the　municipality，
town　or　village　where　a　power　plant　is　sited，　while　the　same　amount　is　divided
among　the　municipalities，　towns　and　villages　adjoining　it．　　In　othr　words，　both
the　nuclear　Oity，　town　or　village，　and　the　surrounding　cities，　towns　and
viIlages，　all　profit　from　the　presence　of　a　power　plant．　　This　grant　helps
local　governments　improve　both　the　social　welfare　of　the　residents　and　the
infrastr1】cture　of　the　communities．　The　amount　of　the　award　is　caIculated　using
the　following　formula：
』Maximum　amount　＝　power　production　capacity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　x　unit　price　（yen／kW）　x　coefficient．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　x　2　（1　for　hydroelectric）
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The　differential　unit　prices　and　coefficients　are　shown　in　the　next　Table．
TABLE　3，　SCALE　OF　NATIONAL　GOVERNMENT　COMPENZATION
　　　　　　　　　TO　LOCAL　GOVERNMENT
Facilities Unit
Price
（yen／kW）
Coefficient
NUCIear　pOWer　reaCtOr
Reprocessing　Plant
Experimental　and
　　testing　laboratory
Research　reactor
Fast　breeder　reactor
Enrichment　plant
Fossil　fuel　power　plant
Hydroe韮ectric　plant
450
350
450
300
300
450
200－450
200
?「??
????????
In　terms　of　both　a．higher　1】nit　price　and　a　higher　coefficient，　it　is　evident
that　a　nuclear　power　plant　will　be　more　profitable　to　local　government，
compared　with　a　fossile　fuel　or　hydro　power　plant．
5．4．　ProPertY　tax
Fourthly，　there　is　yet　another　economic　benefit　for　electricity－producing
localities－－a　property　tax．　　In　the　case　of　a　1000　MWe　nuclear　power　planし　　the
tax　revenue　for　the　first　year　is　estimated　to　be　as　much　as　2，300　million　yen
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（or　US＄18　million），　finishing　with　313　million　yen　（or　US＄2．5mi11ion）　in　its
15・h（1as・）year，　C・ns・der・・g・h・t．　m・s・nucl・a・p・wer　plan・s　are　s・t・d・’E
depopulated　areas　with　no　significant　modern　industry，　a　nuclear　power　plant　is
not　only　a　major　source　of　revenue　to　a　local　government，　but　is　also　expected
to　be　an　important　incentive　for　attracting　more　people　and　business　to　these
desolate　areas．
If　depopulation　goes　on，　and　if　the　national　economy　generally　shollld　slow　down，
a　nuclear　power　plant，　or　any　nuclear－related　facility，　will　become　more
attractive　as　a　source　of　revenue　to　a　local　government．　　Furthermore，　both
filhi、9，．right、。mpensati。n　and　a　regi。nal，。。perati。n　fund、1、。　tend　t。　b，
attractive　to　individual　fishermen．　　Such　a　trend　would　be　even　stronger　in
smaller　fishermen’s　associations　where　the　catch　is　less　rewarding．
6．　THE　STALEMATE　IN　NUCLEAR　S　I　T　I　NG
6，1．　Tactical　oPPosition
Despite　all　these　benefits　which　might　be　obtaioned　if　a　nuclear　plant　were　to
come，　there　still　remains　oPPosition　among　豆ocal　fishermen．　　It　is　noted　that
such　opposition　is』growing　even　stronger　after　Chernobyl，　as　might　be　expected．
Although　its　major　causes　may　vary　from　one　locality　to　another，　it　is
frequently　true　that　such　opposition　may　cease　if　more　favorable　conditions　were
to　be　offered．　　Sometimes　it　is　a　matter　of　the　amount　of　compensation；
sometimes，　a　matter　of　sparing　enough　time　to　reconcile　different　vested
interests　and　remove　divided　opinions　among　members　of　a　fishermen’s　cooperative
ass。ci、ti。n．　S。m，times　’奄煤Bight　b，　th、t。PP。siti。n　i、　i、iti、lly、barg、i、i、g
…a・・g・1・w・・　c・ncess・・ns．　Tact・ca・（・heref・re，・・ndit・・nal）f・r…f
opposition　such　as　these　may　be　coped　with，　case　by　case，　through　painstaking
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perSOn｝tO－PerSOn　COmmUniCatiOnS．
6．2．　Money　is　not　sufficient
It　should　be　remembered，　however，　that　money　is　double－edged．　　There　is　a
Japanese　saying：　‘‘Never　slap　him　in　the　face　with　a　role　of　bank　notes．”
Further【nore，　money　can　buy　neither　one’s　heart　nor　one’s　conscience．　In　other
words，　while　money　may　be　a　necessary　condition，　it　is　rarely　sufficient．　　True，
too　much　emphasis　on　economic　benefit’s　cou藍d　hurt　the　pride　and　self－esteem　of
‘persons　concerned’　and　turn　them　into　outright　opponents．　　A　Faustian
seduction　would　not　always　be　the　case．
6，3．　Damage　by　rumors
Subsequent　to　the　Chernobyl　accident，　there　has　been　yet　another　new　cause　for
opposition　among　farmers　as　well　as　a【nong　fishermen．　　This　new　phenomenon　is
called　‘damage　by　rumors’．　　The　shock　of　Chernobyl　was　so　strong　among　the
general　populace　in　Japan　that　if　any　anomaly　at　a　nllclear　power　station　is
reported　in　mass　media，　it　will　quickly　become　associated　with　a　critical
radioactive　hazard－一一especially　a　radioactive　contamination　of　agric1】ltural
produce．　　When　some　anomaly　occurs　at　a　nuclear　power　plant　or　a　nuclear－
related　facility，　therefore，　consumers　tend　to　avoid　buying　the　produce　from
theSe　Iocalities，　in　fear　that　it　might　be　radioactively　contaminated，　harmful
to　their　life．
Farmers　and　fishermen　who　live　in’the　localities　adjoining　to　a　nuclear－related
facility　have　thus　found　that　‘ruI阜ors’　are　as　threatening　to　their　business　as
could　be　a　severe　nuclear　accident　itself．　　It　is　difficult　for　farmers　and
fishermen　to　cope　with　rumors　which　are　unpredictable　and　uncontrollable．　　It
is　difficult　for　them　to　refute　rumors　in　a　logical　way，　because　rumors　appeal
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to　the　emotion　of　consumers，　not　to　their　reason．　　Thus，　farmers　and　fishermen
were　quick　to　learn　that　the　siting　of　a　nuclear　facility　in　their　neighborhood
would　cause　a　serious　‘damage　by　rumors’　and　are　inclined　to　oppose　it　despite
considerable　economic　profits　it　might　bring　to　them．
In　fact，　because　of　moun口ng　oPPosition　in　the　localities　adjoining　to　a　nuc且ear
site，　a　lead　time　between　the　initial　negotiation　with　the　localities　and　the
beginning　of　reactor　operation　has　tended　to　extend　from　the　average　of　8　years
in　the　1970’s，　・through　the　average　of　more　than　15　years　in　the　1980’s，　to　the
average　of　more　than　25　years　in　the　early　1990’s．　　If　this　trend　were　to
continue，　time　wollld　come　sooner　or　later　when　ne孟ther　farmers　nor　fishermen
would　approve　the　siting　of　a　new　nuclear　power　plant　or　a　nuclear－related
facility　in　their　neighborhood．　　In　farmers　and　fishermen，　the　risk－benefit
balance　is　thus　upset　by　increasing　fear　of　‘damage　by　rumors’．
7．　SOME　SOLUT　l　ONS　IN　SIGHT
To　enhance　public　acceptance，　both　‘communication　by　word’　and　‘compensations　to
persons　concerned’　may　be　necessary　conditions，　but　they　are　rarely　sufficient．
　　The　Japanese　cases　illustrated　above　may　present　good　examples．　　There　have　to
be　some　solutions　for　this　problem．
7．1．　‘‘Micro－leveド’　solutions
First，　at　the　‘micro’　level，　it　may　be　necessary　for　both　the　industry　and　the
national　government　to　develop　a　more　effective　system　of　risk　communication　so
that　they　can　help　lay　publics　better　understand　the　nature　of　various　risks
surrounding　them　and　the　ways　in　which　the　lay　publics　can　effectively　cope　with
these　risks．　　Radioactive　hazard　is　no　more　than　one　of　such　numerous　risks
一14一
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which　sllrround　vs　in　our　contemporary　age．　　We　have　to　find　the　ways　whereby　we
can　cope　with　these　numerous　risks　intelligently　by　using　appropriate
technology，　皿ethods，　manpower，　and　materials．
Risk　communication　offers　one　of　such　useful　instruments　to　attain　this　goal．
Furthermore，　a　risk　co㎜unlcation　system　is　a　social　institution　which　involves
i・teractive‘dia1・9・es’between　the　c・mm・nicat・rs　and　c．・mm・nicatees－一一e　between
the　industry　and　the　national　government　on　one　hand　and　the　Iay　publics　on　the
other。　　It　also　involves　an　apPropriate　modeling　of　the　source，　the　content　and
the　channels　of　risk　commljnication　so　that　they　may　be　made　most　effective　to　a
specific　audience．　　The　Iiterature　already　abounds　on　risk　communication，
par口cularly　in　the　United　States．（6）　It　is　a　pity　that　no　systematic　“manua1”
has　been　published　ln　Japanese　regarding　risk　commuication　and　its　apPlications．
7．2．　　‘5Macro－leveド’　solutions
Secondly，　at　the　‘macro’　level，　the　emphasis　seems　to　be　shifting　from　a
consideration　of　‘compensation’　to　a　consideration　of　‘community－bunding’，　as
the　localities　are　becoming　more　and　more　concerned　with　a　且ong－term　social　and
politica隻　development　（community－building）　and　economic　growth　　（effective　use
of　material　and　hlllnan　resources）　with　their　own　initiative．
Consequently，　government　and　industry　should　encourage　these　locaiities　to
decide　their　own　future　by　offering　an　appropriate　technicaI　advice　and　general
formula　for　com【nunity－building．　　For　example，　they　can　offer　“brainpower”　which
might　be　insufficient　in　a　population－scarce　desolate　locality．　　They　can　help
found　a　secondary　or　tertiary　technical　school　for　the　local　youth　who　might
otherwise　be　tempted　to　leave　their　home　towns　and　villages　for　‘big　cities’　ln
search　of　better　education　and　jobs．　　Exisiting　conpensations，　subsidies　and
property　tax　may　be　considered　as　valuable　financial　resources　to　attain　these
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10ng－term　goals．
In　view　of　these　factors，　new　symbiotic　co－existence　between　a　power　plant　and
nearby　communities　has　been　recommended　by　the　Sllbcommittee　on　Fundamental
Issues　of　Electiricity　of　the　Electric　Utihty　Industry　Counci1，　the　Ministry　of
International　Trade　and　Industry．　（7〕　　The　subcommittee’s　recommendations　cover，
among　other　things，　two　major　objectives：（1｝a　‘‘symbiosis”　between　a　power　plant
and　local　industries，　and　（2）　a　“symbiosis”　between　a　power　plant　and　local
people．　The　former　includes　a　wider　utilization　of　physical　resources，　such　as
the　steam　and　hot　water　generated　by　a　power　plant，　and　the　siting　space　of　a
power　plant　itself，　both　as　the　valuable　means　to　assist　local　agricultura1，
fishing　and　leisure　industries．　　The　latter，　on　the　other　hand，　involves　the
welfare　of　local　people　generally，　such　as　improving　the　infrastructure，
building　a　modern　hospital，　and　discounting　power　rates　as　much　as　50％　for　the
residents　of　a　community　near　to　a　newly　built　power　plant．　　It　is　important　to
note　that　these　new　‘‘privileges”　to　be　granted　to　a　locality　and　local　people
under　the　present　recommendations　are　not　to　be　limited　to　a　new　nuclear　power
Plant　b、t　t。　all　ki、ds。f　new　p。wer’垂撃≠獅狽刀D
8．　CONCLUS　I　ONS
In　conclusion，　it　may　be　said　that　any　reasonable　solution　for　national　energy
issues　will　largely　rest　on　the　foresight　and　the　initiative　of　the　responsible
government　and　industry．　　It　has　become　certain　by　this　time　that　the
communication　by　word　alone　cannot　dirninish　nagging　opposition　to　nuclear　power．
It　has　also　become　clear　that　the　Faustian　seduction，　if　it　should　exist，　wHl
have　only　limited　effects　in　the　energy　issues．　In　order　to　restore　public　trust
and　enhance　public．　acceptance，　further　discussions　may㍉be　required　as　to：　how
to　shape　the　global　perspectives　on　the　alternative　future　of　energy；　how　to
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develop　the　institution　of　effective　risk　communication　whereby　people　can　cope
with　the　uncertain　future　of　energy　more　rationally；　and　how　to　consider　both
short－term　and　long－term　“symbiosis四　between　a　power　plant　and　the　communities
and　people　affected　by　it．
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